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While the Civil War all but consumed Abraham Lincoln’s 
presidency, it did not account for all United States military action 
in those years. The 1860s also witnessed the beginning of the 
Indian Wars on the western frontier. Of these military 
engagements, Lincoln had the most direct involvement with the 
Minnesota Dakota War (sometimes called the Great Sioux 
Uprising or Little Crow’s War). By the summer of 1862, the 
Santee Sioux of Minnesota (hereinafter “Dakota”) had ceded most 
of their land to the United States in exchange for a narrow strip of 
land along the Minnesota River and the promise of annuity 
payments. But several years of drought and crop failures, corrupt 
Indian agents who cheated them out of their annuities, and 
mounting frustration over their vanishing way of life, became too 
much for many Dakota. On August 17, 1862, a group of teenaged 
Dakota boys murdered five settlers just outside of Acton, 
Minnesota. Fearful of white retaliation, the Dakota Council voted 
for war, and the next morning several bands of Dakota warriors, 
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led by Little Crow, attacked white settlement towns, killing, 
raping, and plundering indiscriminately.1 
Lincoln assigned General John Pope, fresh from a startling 
defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run, to put down the uprising. 
Pope saw the assignment as an opportunity to regain his reputation 
and vowed to “utterly exterminate the Sioux…They are to be 
treated as maniacs and wild beasts.”2 Assisted by Minnesota 
Governor Alexander Ramsey and militia Colonel Henry H. Sibley, 
the campaign against the Dakota was concluded in thirty-seven 
days of fighting. But the cost was high: approximately 358 settlers 
were killed, along with 106 soldiers and militia members, and 
twenty-nine Dakota warriors.3 Hundreds of Dakota were taken 
captive and placed in prisoner camps. 
A military commission of five officers was established to 
summarily try the Indians who had participated in the uprising. 
Working at breakneck speed, in just five weeks the commission 
conducted 392 trials, sometimes as many as forty per day. A 
presumption of guilt applied at the trials; that is, it was assumed 
that each warrior had participated in the uprising and would be 
punished. No legal counsel was provided for the accused. While 
each defendant was allowed to make a statement on his own 
behalf, he was not permitted to call witnesses. Then prosecution 
witnesses were called—usually eyewitnesses who testified that 
they had seen the defendant fire a weapon, kill a settler, or commit 
an atrocity. One key witness, a mixed-blood man named Godfrey, 
testified against over fifty individuals, and for his cooperation 
                                                 
1 For two of the most complete accounts of the Dakota War, see: Scott 
W. Berg, 38 Nooses: Lincoln, Little Crow, and the Beginning of the Frontier’s 
End (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012), and Kenneth Carley, The Sioux 
Uprising of 1862 (St. Paul, Minnesota: Minnesota Historical Society, 1976). 
2 “Letter from General Pope Declaring his Goal of Exterminating the 
Sioux.” In Their Own Words: Excerpts from Speeches & Letters Concerning the 
Dakota Conflict. University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, accessed 
April 9, 2016. 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/dakota/Dakota_excerpts.html.    
3 Estimates of the war’s casualties vary. The figures used here are from 
Carol Chomsky, “The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military 
Injustice,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 1(November 1990): 21-22.   
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received a life sentence rather than the death penalty. A total of 
303 Dakota men were found guilty and sentenced to hang. Public 
sentiment in Minnesota overwhelmingly approved the verdicts, and 
most residents demanded that the executions quickly take place. 
Before the death sentences could be carried out, however, 
President Lincoln had to review the trial records, as mandated by 
federal law. Lincoln sought to balance a sense of justice against the 
public insistence for revenge. He said, “Anxious to not act with so 
much clemency as to encourage another outbreak on one hand, nor 
with so much severity as to be real cruelty on the other, I ordered a 
careful examination of the records of the trials to be made…”4 
Lincoln further refined the basis for his decision by differentiating 
between those “who were proven to have participated 
in massacres, as distinguished from participation in battles.” In 
short, unlike the military commission, Lincoln distinguished 
between “individual acts and group warfare.” This was an 
important distinction to Lincoln. He “did not propose to…declare 
to the world that he had agreed to the execution of three hundred 
prisoners of war.”5 Using these standards, Lincoln pared the list of 
condemned men to thirty-eight after two months of analysis. The 
Dakota militants were executed on December 26, 1862 in 
Mankato, Minnesota, the largest single mass execution in 
American history. 
Because the vast majority of scholars, historians, and 
authors who have examined Lincoln’s presidency have focused on 
the Civil War, many have completely ignored the events in 
Minnesota or have, at best, given them only summary treatment. 
Stephen B. Oates’ brief treatment of the subject in his With Malice 
Toward None: A Life of Abraham Lincoln is typical. Addressing 
the treaties that the Lincoln Administration had negotiated with 
various Indian tribes, Oates writes only that “Lincoln had himself 
                                                 
4 David A. Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy and 
Politics (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1978), 95. 
5 Carol Chomsky, “Unites States-Dakota War Trials,” 21, and William 
Lee Miller, President Lincoln: The Duty of a Statesman (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2008), 124.  
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intervened in the Minnesota Indian War of 1862 and had prevented 
vengeful whites from executing a number of innocent Sioux.”6 
There are, however, exceptions to these summary 
treatments, and a notable divergence in how different categories of 
authors have treated Lincoln’s role in the Dakota War. Writers of 
mainstream books and articles, on the whole, have approved of 
Lincoln’s actions. Law review article writers and authors offering 
Native perspectives have been much more likely to be critical. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine all sides of the debate, and 
suggest new avenues of primary research to deepen our 
understanding of this crucial moment in Lincoln’s presidency. 
 
Mainstream Books and Articles 
 
There are thousands of books written about the life and 
times of Abraham Lincoln, and the limited scope of this paper 
cannot review more than a small fraction of them. Important 
categories of Lincoln books can be established and examined, 
however. The first category includes those biographies so well-
received and respected that they were awarded the Gilder Lehrman 
Lincoln Prize, the most coveted and prestigious honor in the field 
of Lincoln studies over the past two decades. Of the twenty 
                                                 
6 Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: A Life of Abraham 
Lincoln (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 368. Recent books on Lincoln that 
do not mention the Dakota War or Lincoln’s role include: Kenneth L. Deutsch 
and Joseph R. Fornieri, eds., Lincoln’s American Dream: Clashing Political 
Perspectives (Sterling, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2005); William E. Gienapp, 
Abraham Lincoln and Civil War America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002); Thomas Keneally, Abraham Lincoln (New York: Viking, 2003); George 
McGovern, Abraham Lincoln (New York: Times Books, 2009); Geoffrey Perret, 
Lincoln’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Greatest President as Commander 
in Chief (New York: Random House, 2004); Ronald C. White, Jr., A. Lincoln: A 
Biography (New York: Random House, 2009). Recent books that give the topic 
only brief mention include: James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil 
War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); William Lee Miller, 
President Lincoln: The Duty of a Statesman (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008); 
and Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the 
Promise of America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2009). 
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Lincoln Prize winning books, only two deal directly with Lincoln’s 
role in the Dakota War. The most recent of which approves of 
Lincoln’s intentions, if not his actions. The other applauds both.7 
Michael Burlingame’s multi-volume Abraham Lincoln: A 
Life won the Lincoln Prize in 2010.8  Burlingame’s ten page 
analysis of Lincoln and the Dakota War is easily the most 
comprehensive of all the works in this category. Burlingame 
emphasizes the intense public and political pressure that Lincoln 
faced in his handling of the events. In addition to providing 
Minnesota newspaper editorial quotes calling for quick action, and 
the congressional outrage expressed in Washington, other more-
obscure sources are noted. For example, Burlingame quotes 
feminist and abolitionist Jane Grey Swisshelm, who condemned 
the Indians as “crocodiles,” asserting that they had “just as much 
right to life as hyenas,” and urged Lincoln’s administration to 
“exterminate the wild beasts and make peace with the devil and all 
his hosts sooner than with these red-jawed tigers whose fangs are 
dripping with the blood of innocents.”9 Another example comes 
from a St. Paul resident who wrote to Lincoln and “painted a lurid 
picture” of the atrocities that had occurred. The writer asked the 
President to imagine: 
 
The shape of a human, but with that shape horribly 
disfigured with paint & feathers to make its 
presence more horrible, should enter your home in 
the dead hours of night, & approach your pillow 
with a glittering tomahawk in one hand, & a 
scalping knife in the other, his eyes gleaming with a 
thirst for bold, you would spring from your bed in 
terror, and flee for your life;…there you would see 
                                                 
7 For a complete list of past winners of the Gilder Lehrman Lincoln 
Prize, see: “Previous Winners,” Gettysburg College, accessed April 9, 2016. 
https://www.gettysburg.edu/lincolnprize/previous-winners.dot.  
8 Michael Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln: A Life (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2008). 
9 Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln, 3271, citing Jane Grey Swisshelm, 
Half a Century (Chicago: Jansen, McClurg, 1880), 223. 
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the torch applied to the house your hands had 
built…your wife, or your daughter, though she 
might not yet have seen twelve sweet 
summers…ravished before your eyes, & carried 
into a captivity worse than death.10 
 
In addition to these sources, Burlingame raises a point not 
found elsewhere. Lincoln, he writes, considered “order[ing] 
thousands of paroled [Confederate] prisoners-of-war” to 
Minnesota” to fight against the Dakota.11 Ultimately the plan was 
scrapped out of concerns that it would violate the prisoner 
exchange cartel that was being negotiated with the Confederacy. 
Burlingame’s mention of this fascinating military maneuver is 
rarely found in other works. 
Burlingame concludes his section on the Dakota War on an 
unexpected note. Rather than judge Lincoln’s actions as just or 
vengeful, Burlingame instead writes that the entire episode caused 
Lincoln to pledge to reexamine the methods in which the national 
government was dealing with Indian issues. Privately to friends, 
and publicly as part of his 1863 message to Congress, Lincoln 
vowed that “this Indian system shall be reformed.”12 The 
implication is that Lincoln would have replaced his own ad hoc 
executive measures with a just and humane policy to Indians. But, 
Burlingame notes, he did not live to see this happen. 
David Donald’s seminal Lincoln, the 1996 Lincoln Prize 
winner, offers a brief but sympathetic view of Lincoln’s actions 
during the Dakota War. Acknowledging that Lincoln was not well-
informed on Indian affairs and, like most whites at the time, 
considered them to be a people who needed paternalistic guidance 
and protection, Donald writes that Lincoln “refused to be 
stampeded” by those who called for vengeance against the 
Minnesota Indians.13 He notes correctly that Lincoln “deliberately 
                                                 
10 Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln, 3272. 
11 Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln, 3269. 
12 Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln, 3276.  
13 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster 
Paperbacks, 1996), 394. 
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went through the records of each convicted man, seeking to 
identify those who had been guilty of the most atrocious crimes, 
especially murders of innocent farmers and rape.” Lincoln’s 
actions, Donald concludes, “ignited a brief firestorm of protest of 
Minnesota,” but it quickly passed.14 This assessment is only 
partially correct. The Republican Party did not do well in 
Minnesota in the 1862 elections, reflecting the outrage over the 
massacres and Lincoln’s contemplated clemency actions. Further, 
the fact that U.S. troops were used to combat the Dakota weakened 
the Union war effort, both in terms of active duty soldiers and 
draft-eligible men, many of whom joined the Minnesota militia 
under Ramsay, thus avoiding the national draft. Finally, while the 
Dakota uprising in Minnesota was indeed quashed relatively 
quickly, Indian troubles in the West only increased. 
The number of Lincoln Prize winners that do not include 
any mention of the Dakota War is surprising. The 2012 winner, 
Elizabeth D. Leonard’s Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally: Judge Advocate 
General Joseph Holt of Kentucky, provides a good example.15 
Although Holt became Lincoln’s Judge Advocate General in 
September 1862 and advised Lincoln that he could not delegate his 
responsibility to review the legal proceedings involving the 
condemned Dakota prisoners, Leonard does not mention the 
specific events in her otherwise excellent and thorough biography. 
Similarly, Doris Kearns Goodwin, who won both the 2006 Lincoln 
Prize and the Pulitzer Prize for Team of Rivals: The Political 
Genius of Abraham Lincoln, does not mention the Minnesota 
episode.16 Other notable works that exclude the Dakota War 
include James McPherson’s Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as 
Commander in Chief and Allen C. Guelzo’s Abraham Lincoln: 
Redeemer President.17 
                                                 
14 Donald, Lincoln, 393-395.  
15 Elizabeth D. Leonard, Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally: Judge Advocate 
General Joseph Holt of Kentucky (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
16 Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of 
Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005). 
17 James M. McPherson, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as 
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A second category of books includes three that deal more 
specifically with Lincoln and Native Americans. The standard 
work in this category is David Nichols’ Lincoln and the Indians: 
Civil War Politics and Policies.18 Nichols, the former dean of the 
faculty at Southwestern College in Kansas, first published this 
book in 1978. (It was reissued in 2012, the 150th anniversary of the 
Dakota War.) It remains the only full-length book on the Lincoln 
Administration’s policies regarding Native Americans and is 
regularly cited by other writers. The first, entitled “Indian Affairs 
in Minnesota: ‘A System of Wholesale Robberies,’” examines the 
failures and corruption surrounding the treatment of Indians in the 
state. The second chapter, “Rebellion in Minnesota: ‘A Most 
Terrible and Exciting Indian War,’” describes the events of the 
uprising, and the third chapter, “Lincoln and the Sioux Execution: 
‘I Could Not Afford to Hang Men for Votes,’” examines Lincoln’s 
review of the trials and his decision regarding the appropriate 
punishment. 
In this third chapter Nichols, like Burlingame, focuses on 
the intense political pressure Lincoln faced to uphold the 
executions of all those Dakota found guilty. Nichols argues, 
however, that Indian missionary Stephen Riggs and Episcopal 
Bishop Henry Whipple influenced Lincoln to act with compassion 
rather than vengeance. Riggs, Nichols writes, was particularly 
persuasive in his pleas for flexibility and mercy. In reaching his 
final determination, Nichols describes Lincoln as “haunted,” 
“troubled,” “reluctant,” and finally “pragmatic.”19 He concludes 
that Lincoln’s actions, in balancing public sentiment against a 
sense of justice and equity, “were relatively humanitarian.”20 
While Nichols’ conclusion is almost entirely sympathetic to 
Lincoln, he does offer one refreshing perspective not found in 
                                                                                                             
Commander in Chief (New York: Penguin Group, 2008); Allen C. Guelzo, 
Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 1999). 
18 David A. Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Politics and 
Policies (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1978). 
19 Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, 107-112. 
20 Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, 114. 
88  Spring 2016 
 
other sources: while Lincoln did not satisfy the demands of 
outraged Minnesotans, he did not completely ignore them, either. 
Lincoln supported, and then signed, legislation that removed the 
Dakota from Minnesota, and approved the payment of $2 million 
in reparations to the uprising’s victims as “reasonable 
compensation for the depredations committed.”21 
In 2012, Minnesota native and historian Scott W. Berg 
published 38 Nooses: Lincoln, Little Crow, and the Beginning of 
the Frontier’s End.22 This lively, well-researched book will likely 
become the definitive work on the Dakota War for years to come. 
It analyzes in great detail the causes of the uprising, the deplorable 
conditions on the reservation, and the settlers’ attempts to make 
homes on the northern Minnesota prairies. The book pays 
particular attention to the plight of the victims of the war, telling 
the family stories before, during, and after the events of August 
1862. The book sets forth the pressures Lincoln felt to uphold the 
convictions and approve the executions, but does not, however, 
shed new light on his struggle to reach a just decision. Berg 
concludes that Lincoln - ever the lawyer - acted in a cool and 
detached manner in sanctioning the thirty-eight executions. Berg’s 
Lincoln wisely distanced himself from emotion. He approved 
executions “where he felt reasonable moral standards had been 
violated and reasonable legal standards, according to the strictures 
of the day, upheld.” Berg downplays any empathy or compassion 
Lincoln may have felt; rather, he writes that “on the question of 
war and emancipation, Lincoln lost sleep, but not so on the many 
death sentences he commuted or confirmed.”23 
The most recent book devoted to the Dakota War is Gustav 
Niebuhr’s Lincoln’s Bishop: A President, a Priest, and the Fate of 
300 Dakota Sioux Warriors.24 Niebuhr, a professor of journalism 
at Syracuse University who specializes in religious commentary, 
                                                 
21 Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, 117. 
22 Scott W. Berg, 38 Nooses: Lincoln, Little Crow, and the Beginning of 
the Frontier’s End (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012). 
23 Berg, 38 Nooses, 222. 
24 Gustav Niebuhr, Lincoln’s Bishop: A President, A Priest, and the 
Fate of 300 Dakota Sioux Warriors (New York: HarperCollins, 2014).  
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examines the life and work of Henry Whipple, Bishop of 
Minnesota’s Episcopal Church in the 1860s, who worked tirelessly 
to convince Lincoln – and Congress – that the Indian system was 
unfair and badly in need of reform. Niebuhr is sympathetic to 
Whipple’s task. He offers a unique, and welcome, perspective in 
regards to Whipple’s relentless lobbying efforts on behalf of the 
Minnesota Dakota, a people with whom he had spent three years 
evangelizing and converting to Christianity. 
Whipple was never comfortable in Washington, Niebuhr 
writes, but his unending devotion to moral authority drove him 
when lesser men would have given up. Along with Henry Riggs, 
Whipple met personally with Lincoln on several occasions and 
wrote a series of essays, published in Minnesota newspapers, 
urging fair treatment for the Dakota. In the end, Niebuhr 
convincingly argues that Whipple’s personal pleas to Lincoln to 
act out of compassion and mercy for an oppressed people had the 
desired effect. Niebuhr notes that Whipple was, like Lincoln, 
strongly pro-Union and anti-slavery. Perhaps more important, the 
bishop and the President shared a firm “appreciation of God’s 
sovereignty.” Mistreatment of Native Americans, Whipple argued, 
was akin to slavery, and as such was subject to God’s terrible 
judgment.25 In Niebuhr’s examination, Lincoln’s actions represent 
the combination of the godly and the good. 
A third category that can be examined includes books and 
articles specifically devoted to the Dakota War. Four books fall 
into this category: Kenneth Carley’s The Sioux Uprising of 1862; 
Michael Clodfelter’s The Dakota War: The United States Army 
Versus the Sioux, 1862-1865; Hank Cox’s Lincoln and the Sioux 
Uprising of 1862; and Duane Schultz’s Over the Earth I Come: 
The Great Sioux Uprising of 1862.26 All of these books essentially 
                                                 
25 Niebuhr, Lincoln’s Bishop, 169. 
26 Kenneth Carley, The Sioux Uprising of 1862 (St. Paul, Minnesota: 
Minnesota Historical Society, 1976); Michael Clodfelter, The Dakota War: The 
United States Army Versus the Sioux, 1862-1865 (Jefferson, North Carolina: 
McFarland, 1998); Hank H Cox, Lincoln and the Sioux Uprising of 1862 
(Nashville, Tennessee: Cumberland House, 2005); Duane Schultz, Over the 
Earth I Come: The Great Sioux Uprising of 1862 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
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cover the same ground. Each work discusses the corruption of the 
Indian system in Minnesota that led to the uprising, the atrocities 
committed against defenseless settlers, and the military actions that 
ended the war. Each book presents the dilemma Lincoln faced: 
should he yield to public and political pressure and uphold the 
executions of 300 Dakota, or should he follow his conscience and 
personal sense of justice? Each author concludes that Lincoln 
reached a fair compromise, and each expresses admiration that 
Lincoln managed to take time out from the overwhelming 
complexities of the Civil War to personally attend to the situation 
in Minnesota. None of these books are scholarly; that is, they are 
not thoroughly researched and utilize only a few basic sources.27 
Several mainstream articles address Lincoln’s actions in the 
Dakota War. Almost all portray Lincoln in a sensitive, almost 
heroic light, as a fair-minded man who saw through the politics 
and acted not with vengeance, but with compassion. Typical of this 
vanilla-flavored writing is Daniel W. Homstad’s “Lincoln’s 
Agonizing Decision,” published in the December 2001 issue of 
American History.28 More nuanced, but ultimately just as 
approving, is historian Ron Soodalter’s article “Lincoln and the 
Sioux,” which appeared in The New York Times in August 2012. 
Soodalter’s article explores no new ground, but places the Indian 
uprising in Minnesota squarely in a Civil War context. Soodalter 
writes that “given the mood of the country” in 1862, the wonder of 
the event is that Lincoln “took the time away from a war that was 
going badly – and threatened the very existence of our nation – to 
                                                                                                             
1992). 
27 Reviewers were particularly critical of Cox’s book. Gary Clayton 
Anderson, professor of history at the University of Oklahoma, called it “terribly 
flawed” and “outdated,” and concluded that “such books as this, which appear to 
be history, do more harm than good.” Gary Clayton Anderson, review of Lincoln 
and the Sioux Uprising of 1862, by Hank H. Cox, Minnesota History 60, no. 2 
(Summer 2006): 179. 
28 Daniel W. Homstad, “Lincoln’s Agonizing Decision,” American 
History 36 (December 2001): 28-36. Decades earlier, historian Walter N. 
Trenerry weighed in on the subject with a markedly similar approach. Walter N. 
Trennery, “The Minnesota Rebellion Act of 1862: A Legal Dilemma of the Civil 
War,” Minnesota History 35, no. 1 (Mach 1956): 1-10. 
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examine one at a time the cases of more than 300 Sioux, and to 
spare the lives of all but 38 of them.”29 
 
Law Review Articles 
 
Three law review articles, spanning twenty-three years, 
reach very different conclusions than the above works regarding 
the propriety of Lincoln’s actions in the Dakota War. In 1990, 
University of Minnesota law professor Carol Chomsky published 
“The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military 
Injustice.”30 In this exhaustive article Chomsky analyzes the causes 
and events of the war, the legitimacy of the subsequent trial and 
executions, and Lincoln’s review of the legal proceedings. She 
concludes that because the Dakota were a sovereign nation at war 
with the United States, the warriors should have been tried only for 
possible war crime violations, and not for the civilian crimes of 
murder, rape, and robbery. With these standards in mind, Chomsky 
writes, “few of the convictions are supportable.” She argues that 
while “Lincoln’s commutation of all but thirty-eight death 
sentences may have been an effort to correct the trial verdicts to 
reflect the proper standard of responsibility,” the illegality of the 
trials cannot be overlooked. “The flaws in the proceedings,” 
Chomsky writes, “make even [Lincoln’s] judgments 
questionable.”31 
Aside from Lincoln’s assignment of Pope to Minnesota, 
Chomsky notes that Lincoln’s involvement in the war began on 
October 14, when he and his cabinet first heard of the ongoing 
military trials and planned executions. Disturbed by this news, 
Lincoln directed that no executions take place without his sanction. 
One month later, upon learning that 303 men had been sentenced 
to hang, and having become aware that federal statute required 
                                                 
29 Ron Soodalter, “Lincoln and the Sioux,” The New York Times, August 
20, 2012, accessed April 9, 2016, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/lincoln-and-the-sioux/.  
30 Carol Chomsky, “The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in 
Military Injustice,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 1(November 1990):13-98.  
31 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 15. 
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presidential approval before sentences of death could be carried 
out, Lincoln requested “the full and complete record of their 
convictions” and “a careful statement” indicating “the more guilty 
and influential of the culprits.”32 
Chomsky notes that Lincoln was under intense pressure to 
approve all of the executions. Upon forwarding the requested 
transcripts, Pope urged the president to quickly approve the 
sentences, claiming that “the only distinction between the culprits 
is as to which of them murdered most people or violated most 
young girls.”33 Minnesota Governor Ramsey also wrote to Lincoln, 
urging that he approve the death sentences for the condemned. 
Chomsky also summarizes the “great public outcry” that existed in 
Minnesota. Several state newspapers expressed outrage that 
Lincoln would even consider leniency in the matter.34 Relatives of 
the war’s victims wrote directly to Lincoln, describing the horror 
and cruelties that had been inflicted upon their family members by 
rampaging “savages.” Colonel Stephen Miller, commander of the 
regiment holding the Dakota men, advised Lincoln that there 
would be a “fearful and bloody demonstration” by the citizenry 
against the condemned if Lincoln pardoned any of them (some 400 
citizens signed a letter threatening to kill the prisoners if they were 
not executed). Even Miller’s own soldiers were anxious for 
“prompt and universal execution of the guilty savages.”35 Further, 
Minnesota’s congressional delegation contacted Lincoln, outlining 
the stories of rape and mutilation “well known to our people,” 
urging that Lincoln approve the executions. If he did not, they 
warned, “the outraged people of Minnesota would dispose of these 
wretches without law.”36 They also demanded that Lincoln provide 
a full report to the Senate that described the war actions and 
government response.37 Curiously, Chomsky does not address the 
                                                 
32 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 29. 
33 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 29. 
34 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 29. One such headline 
read: “DEATH TO THE BARBARIANS!”  
35 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 31-32. 
36 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 30. 
37 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 30. 
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fact that Lincoln needed full support from Minnesota in the war 
effort against the Confederacy; presidential clemency would have 
jeopardized that support. 
Chomsky minimizes the pleas for leniency that Lincoln 
also received. She notes that William P. Dole, Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, suggested that a mass execution would appear to be 
more of an act of “revenge than of punishment,” and that Bishop 
Henry Whipple urged clemency for those found guilty of lesser 
crimes than rape or murder.38 These pleas, however, receive barely 
more than a mention in Chomsky’s review. 
In the end, writes Chomsky, Lincoln attempted to strike a 
balance: he would not bow to the overwhelming public, military, 
and political demand for vengeance, and would exercise at least 
some of the humanity that his conscience called for. He would 
carefully examine the records of each of the condemned men 
(Chomsky ignores the fact that Lincoln had two attorneys review 
the records for him and provide detailed findings), and “draw the 
kind of line that would have been legitimate had the Dakota been 
acknowledged as sovereign and tried for violations of the laws of 
war.”39 
Chomsky then summarizes Lincoln’s findings and 
conclusions. She does not review the trial records for each of the 
Dakota; rather, she highlights several individual cases that support 
her position that Lincoln’s actions were of compromise and 
balance. She concludes that “the two convictions for rape were 
undeniable cases of violations of the laws of war.”40 And although 
the underlying trials were flawed, Chomsky writes that Lincoln 
appropriately approved execution for many Dakota who had killed 
“men, women, and children in what appeared to be attacks on 
individuals in their homes or wagons, not as part of larger 
battles.”41 However, some of Lincoln’s conclusions, writes 
Chomsky, “are harder to understand.” She names several warriors 
                                                 
38 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 30. 
39 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 89. 
40 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 90. 
41 Chomsky, “United States-Dakota War Trials,” 89. 
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who were convicted, despite having been engaged in legitimate 
warfare, or whose roles cannot be adequately determined from trial 
testimony.42 
Ultimately, Chomsky, like Lincoln, tries to strike a logical 
balance. She concludes that while the trials were unfairly 
conducted, and that while Lincoln (and the military commission) 
did not recognize the sovereignty of the Dakota or the defined 
proper bounds of warfare, he “constructed an imperfect line.” She 
argues that he acted rationally with respect to the imperfect records 
available, and was successful, to some degree. However, because 
of those imperfections, it cannot be determined whether the 
condemned Dakota “committed acts for which they might 
legitimately have been punished.”43 
The second law review article that examines Lincoln’s role 
in the Dakota War appeared in 2013. In “Remembering the Thirty-
Eight: Abraham Lincoln, the Dakota, and the U.S. War on 
Barbarism,” David Martinez, an associate professor of American 
Indian Studies at Arizona State University, acknowledges 
Chomsky’s work but reaches far harsher conclusions regarding 
Lincoln’s actions.44 Martinez argues that Lincoln’s mythological 
reputation as a kind and compassionate seeker of justice obscures 
his ruthless and misguided actions towards the Indians. To 
Martinez, Lincoln was in reality a “cold and insensitive politician,” 
who acted not out of a sense of morality, but rather political 
expedience.45 Further, although Martinez believes that Lincoln was 
“poorly informed regarding Indian policies,” Lincoln was 
generally aware of the deplorable conditions on Dakota land in 
Minnesota, and knew of the corrupt agents who operated there. 
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Primarily concerned with the Civil War, Lincoln never acted to 
improve government relations with Indians.46 
Martinez finds fault with Lincoln’s actions at each stage of 
the war and the subsequent trials. Lincoln’s decision to dispatch 
General Pope to Minnesota was disastrous, he argues, as Pope 
desired nothing less than a “final settlement” with the Dakota.47 
More significantly, Martinez argues that Lincoln’s renowned legal 
skills and acumen were absent in the Minnesota outbreak. Lincoln 
overlooked the fact that the military tribunals that tried the Dakota 
men were likely illegal, and that, as prisoners of war and members 
of an enemy sovereign nation, the 1806 Articles of War applied to 
the combatants. Therefore, Martinez argues, the accused were 
entitled to legal counsel, to fair and impartial trials, and to 
adequate time to prepare.48  By ignoring the fundamental injustice 
that occurred throughout the military commission process, Lincoln 
proved to be far more concerned with finding a solution to the 
“Indian problem” than in acting in a humane and just manner. 
When confronted with evidence of the Minnesota public’s 
unhappiness and outrage over the deaths of fellow white citizens, 
Lincoln, according to Martinez, “did not know what to do.”49 He 
sought the advice of Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt in the 
hopes that his responsibility to review the cases could be 
delegated. After wavering, Lincoln decided to approve the 
executions for those who had “proved guilty of violating females,” 
but “never once showed any concern for violations against Dakota 
women, or any other Dakota slain by American forces.”50 
According to Martinez, Lincoln’s finding that only two 
warriors could be convicted of rape was “obviously too few to 
quench the bloodlust of settler Minnesotans.” Lincoln then opted to 
reassess the matter, and search for any men who had participated in 
a “massacre” as opposed to legitimate battle or warfare. This 
brought the number of condemnations up to thirty-eight, a figure 
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that, to Martinez, Lincoln could abide. Lincoln had the power, 
notes Martinez, indeed the responsibility, to pardon the men that he 
instead condemned. Instead, he chose to bow to public and 
political pressure and approved the executions.51 
Martinez also finds fault with Lincoln’s public statements 
on the matter. Lincoln produced “great speeches and 
correspondence” throughout the Civil War, writes Martinez, but 
was “disturbingly silent with the respect to the Dakota.”52 He 
“never demonstrated any remorse” for approving the deaths of 
thirty-eight men who were wrongfully convicted.53 He did not 
appear to appreciate Dakota sovereignty, and perhaps “may have 
been biased against Indians” because of the fact that his own 
grandfather had been killed by Indians in 1786, and because he had 
participated in the Black Hawk War of 1832.54 
Lincoln apologists, notes Martinez, buy into the mythical 
perception that Lincoln always acted as a good and just man. They 
stress that Lincoln the humanitarian saved the lives of 265 Dakota 
warriors, but minimize the fact that he approved the conviction and 
execution of thirty-eight others. The real Lincoln, Martinez 
concludes, was a moral coward. He was at best an “accomplice to 
murder,” and at worst “unequivocally guilty of mass murder.”55 
A third law review article also appeared in 2013. Paul 
Finkelman, a professor of law at the Albany Law School, wrote 
“Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian Concerns, and the Dakota 
Pardons,” published in the William Mitchell Law Review.56 
Finkelman’s work strongly supports Lincoln’s actions, including 
on legal grounds, adding a diversity of views to the legal literature. 
Unlike Chomsky and Martinez, Finkelman argues that the Indian 
militants did not represent the entire Dakota nation, and therefore 
should not have been considered a sovereign entity. Martinez 
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would no doubt consider Finkelman a “Lincoln apologist.” 
Finkelman concludes that Lincoln “had no stomach” for granting 
the large-scale executions that the military, politicians, and public 
clamored for In fact, he writes, Lincoln was skeptical about the 
idea” of mass executions from the very beginning.57 Lincoln’s 
decision to pardon the vast majority of those condemned to death, 
continues Finkelman, “dovetailed with his own persistent 
opposition to needless killing and his lifelong commitment to due 
process of law.”58 
Finkelman makes two interesting arguments not found 
elsewhere. First, he writes that Lincoln feared that if he approved 
mass executions of Indians, the Confederacy might then approve 
the same for Union prisoners.59 Rather than saving lives, 
Finkelman argues, a mass execution in Minnesota could have cost 
lives in the Civil War. Next, Finkelman disagrees with Chomsky’s 
conclusion that Lincoln’s judgment was “questionable” because all 
the trials were flawed. Finkelman writes that Chomsky “ignores 
the fact that some of those executed had openly bragged about 
killing civilians, and that some of the evidence for what amounted 
to war crimes was persuasive and compelling.”60 Unfortunately, 
Finkelman offers no sources or documentation for his arguments, 
and thus they lack credibility. Finkelman concludes that “Lincoln 
tried to balance justice with military concerns, issues involving the 
ongoing War of the Rebellion, and fear of renewed violence in 
Minnesota.”61 Perhaps Lincoln should have pardoned more men, 
Finkelman concedes, but after all, the President had “a myriad of 
other demands” that took most of his time and attention.62 
While not technically a law review article, attorney Robert 
B. Norris’s “Lincoln’s Dilemma,” published in the Washington 
Lawyer, an online publication of the District of Columbia Bar, 
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further adds to the lively legal debate about Lincoln’s actions.63 
Like Finkelman, Norris strongly supports Lincoln.  Lincoln made 
the decisions he did, concludes Norris, “partly to satisfy the thirst 
for revenge in Minnesota and partly because there was enough 
evidence that at least some of the Dakota were involved in the 
willful and wanton murder of innocent civilians.” While Norris 
admits that Lincoln did not recognize the sovereignty of the 
Dakota, he concludes that “Lincoln’s ruling was consistent with 
the laws of war prevailing at that time. Those who participated in 
battles should be treated as legitimate belligerents, while those who 
killed innocent civilians had violated the rules of warfare for which 
they were liable for the consequences.”64 
 
Articles from Native Perspectives 
 
One unique subset of Lincoln/Dakota War articles includes 
those written by Native American scholars, or from a Native 
perspective. As is true of law review articles, some are critical of 
Lincoln, while others fall into the “apologist” category. Ryan Winn 
is an English professor at Wisconsin’s College of Menominee 
Nation. In 2013 and 2014 he wrote a two-part article for the Tribal 
College Journal of American Indian Higher Education entitled 
“Abraham Lincoln’s Dakota Legacy.”65 These articles are sharply 
critical of Lincoln, his policies toward Indians, and his mythical 
status. “Like most tragic figures,” writes Winn, “Lincoln’s flaws 
are often ignored by those who prefer to romanticize his triumphs.” 
Winn notes that Lincoln’s many admirers “cite Lincoln’s 
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compassion in pardoning so many Indians,” but historians have 
ignored “the repercussion of the mass execution that he 
sanctioned.”66 Winn argues that Lincoln’s actions must be viewed 
in a larger context than most historians consider, for by sanctioning 
the mass execution Lincoln “endorsed a policy with ramifications 
that ended Dakota life as they knew it.” Further, “Lincoln’s failure 
to condemn the atrocities that non-Natives inflicted upon the 
Dakota people…propagated the long-standing belief that the 
mistreatment of America’s First Peoples was justified as a means 
to achieve Manifest Destiny.”67 
Two years earlier, historian Patrick S. Johnston also 
touched on this theme in “American Forgetting: Abraham Lincoln, 
the Conquest of the West and the Removal of Indians.”68 Johnston 
writes:  
While we can be glad Lincoln didn’t allow mass 
murder of Indians in Minnesota following the 
uprising, we have to remember that removal caused 
far more deaths than occurred at the gallows where 
the 38 Sioux were hung…His view of Indian 
humanity differed from those who carried out the 
massacre in that he did not hate Indians. Yet it was 
that view of the Indian as savage that was 
inescapable for Lincoln. They were not equals. 
They had no civilization…The Indians were 
unfortunately in the way of civilization. The 
wounds of the nation to be bound up that Lincoln 
spoke of did not include those injuries inflicted on 
Indians. The Indians who did end up fighting for the 
Union did not see their situation improve after the 
Civil War was over.69 
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Johnston concludes that Lincoln’s actions as regards the Dakota 
“led down the path which symbolically closed the American 
frontier at Wounded Knee.”70 
 Earlier still, in 2002, Indian activist Michael Gaddy wrote 
an article titled, “United Native America: The American Indian 
and the ‘Great Emancipator’” for Sierra Times, an online 
magazine.71 He sets out to correct the “veneer of lies and historical 
distortions that surround Abraham Lincoln” and the “false 
sainthood and adulation afforded Lincoln.” Gaddy offers a unique 
perspective, believing that Lincoln decided to spare thirty-eight 
Dakota men as a “compromise to the politicians of Minnesota.” In 
return for this mercy, “Lincoln promised to kill or remove every 
Indian from the state and provide Minnesota with 2 million dollars 
in federal funds.”72 There is no evidence to support this contention. 
 Two more-recent articles show that Lincoln’s role is by no 
means settled within the community of Native writers. In her short 
2013 article for Washington Monthly, “Lincoln: No Hero to Native 
Americans,” Sherry Salway Black, Director of the Partnership for 
Tribal Governance at the National Congress of American Indians, 
argues that Lincoln “is not seen as much of a hero at all among 
many American Indians tribes and Native peoples, as the majority 
of his policies proved to be detrimental to them.”73 While she does 
not go into detail, Black summarily refers to the execution of 
thirty-eight Dakota as a “massacre,” comparable to the 1864 Sand 
Creek slaughter by the U.S. Army that left hundreds of Cheyenne 
and Arapaho dead. While the two events were distinguishable - 
Lincoln’s action was to review a military record and make a 
decision, while Sand Creek was the murder of peaceful and 
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innocent Native Americans by a misguided cavalry commander 
who ignored the white flag of peace – both took place under 
Lincoln’s watch. Black correctly writes that “the Emancipation 
Proclamation, while a tremendous step forward for human 
rights…did not end discrimination against Native Americans.”74 
 A much more positive view of Lincoln’s role is found in a 
September 2014 article by journalist Tristan Ahtone.75 Ahtone 
relates the Dakota story from the viewpoint of John LaVelle, a law 
professor at the University of New Mexico. LaVelle’s great-great-
grandfather, a Santee spiritual leader named Ehanamani, was one 
of the Indians originally convicted and condemned, but whose life 
was spared because of Lincoln’s review. LaVelle believes that 
Lincoln:  
 
Recognized these were men, that these were not 
devils or animals or blood-thirsty savages. He knew 
they were being dehumanized in how they were 
described, and used the word ‘men’ to show they 
were human beings. Some say Lincoln ordered the 
largest mass execution in U.S. history, but he also 
facilitated the greatest mass pardon in U.S. history, 
and it was a pardon of Indians.76 
 
Avenues for Further Research 
 
 Abraham Lincoln remains a fascinating figure and a 
popular research subject. Mainstream writers often write adoringly 
of Lincoln. Legal writers, perhaps because they are used to 
examining issues and arguments from both sides, are more varied. 
Native authors can share a unique perspective on Lincoln’s legacy 
that is considerably more nuanced than that of “the Great 
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Emancipator.” This debate is welcome, not because one side can 
be proven “right,” but because all sides illuminate a Lincoln – and 
a critical moment in American history – little before examined. 
 In view of the above, what remains to explore in regards to 
Lincoln and his actions in the Dakota War? There are several 
possibilities. First, Lincoln’s relationship with the three lawyers 
who helped him review the trial records needs to be examined. 
David Holt served as the Judge Advocate General and gave 
Lincoln legal advice when news of the atrocities in Minnesota 
reached Washington. It was Holt who advised Lincoln that the 
duty to review the trials of each of the convicted men could not be 
delegated, but had to be completed by Lincoln or, at the very least, 
under Lincoln’s direct supervision. Was this the correct 
interpretation of the governing statute? Had it ever been utilized 
before? Did Lincoln review all other military-commission trials as 
he reviewed the Dakota trials? Was the Dakota matter the most 
important event in the Lincoln-Holt relationship? Elizabeth D. 
Leonard’s biography Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally: Judge Advocate 
General Joseph Holt of Kentucky, is a good starting point for this 
research, but fails to answer these questions. 
 The other two lawyers who assisted Lincoln in reviewing 
the trial records were Washingtonians George C. Whiting and 
Francis H. Ruggles.77 Who were these men? What was their 
relationship with Lincoln? Why did he trust them to review the 
records? Were they paid? What did they have to say about their 
work? To my knowledge, no author or historian has researched the 
life and times of these men. They played key roles, however, in the 
Lincoln-Dakota story. 
 Second, while Carol Chomsky evaluated several of the 
thirty-eight Dakota men who were convicted, the other trial records 
need to be examined, as well. Were Lincoln’s findings supported 
by the records? Did he make mistakes? We know, for example, 
that at least one man was hanged by mistake simply because his 
name was similar to another warrior’s.78 Was Lincoln truly fair? 
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Was he lenient? What will the trial records tell us, not only about 
the actions of the accused, but of Lincoln’s character and sense of 
fairness? Is his popular reputation deserved? 
 Third, Lincoln’s attitudes and viewpoints regarding Native 
Americans, and his administration’s policies toward them, warrant 
a fresh look. David Nichols’ Lincoln and the Indians is somewhat 
dated. It is also limited in its scope. An examination of Lincoln’s 
role in legislation that proved to be devastating for Native 
Americans is called for. Under his watch the First Transcontinental 
Railroad was started. The 1862 Homestead Act opened up millions 
of acres for white settlement at the expense of traditional Indian 
lands. The Department of Agriculture was created, which worked 
to regulate the very lands that so suddenly became available for 
settlement. And in 1864, the Sand Creek Massacre, one of the most 
atrocious examples of butchery in U.S. military history, occurred 
in Colorado. What were Lincoln’s reactions? Was he involved, or 
even interested, in the Congressional investigation that 
subsequently took place? What can be learned from the legal 
records of those proceedings? 
 Finally, Lincoln utilized political patronage to fill top 
offices in the government. For example, he rewarded Caleb B. 
Smith and William P. Dole with the positions of Secretary of the 
Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, respectively, in 
exchange for Indiana’s twenty-six nomination votes in 1860.79 
What were the politics behind such legislation and maneuvering? 
What were Lincoln’s roles? Did Smith or Dole have any 
experience in dealing with Indians or Indian issues? Did Lincoln 
care? We know much about Lincoln as commander-in-chief, but 
what can be learned about his political skills while serving as Chief 
Executive? The answers to all these questions, and more, are 
waiting to be explored. 
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